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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROCON CORPORATION, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, i 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 920758-CA 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant, Utah Department of Transportation, 
(UDOT) submits this Reply Brief in response to Plaintiff/Appellee 
Procon Corporation's (Procon) Brief of Appellee. The majority of 
Procon's arguments raised in its brief are addressed in UDOT's 
original brief. UDOT disagrees with Procon's arguments 
concerning notice as purportedly communicated to UDOT by Exhibit 
18-P, and Procon's attempts to justify the Court's erroneous 
decision to admit said exhibit into evidence. UDOT further 
disagrees with Procon's arguments concerning the application of 
the Thorn case, waiver of the notice requirement and lack of 
prejudice. This reply brief responds to Procon's arguments in 
those areas. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. UDOT has in fact martialed all the evidence 
that relates to the Finding of Fact by the Court that UDOT was on 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
notice that Procon intended to seek added compensation for moving 
of the waste disposal area and it fails to support the said 
finding. The only evidence is the letter of April 14, 1986 
(Exhibit 18-P) and it should have been excluded since the 
evidence before the Court is that it was not received by UDOT. 
Point II. Procon's assertion that the case of Thorn 
Construction Company v. UDOT is controlling in this case is 
incorrect. In Thorn there was a verbal directive by the Engineer 
which directed the performance of added work. The Engineer in 
that case knew that it involved work beyond that specified in the 
plans. In this case a field change was made by the Engineer 
which he did not consider to be a material or compensible change. 
Point III. UDOT was prejudiced by the lack of notice 
contrary to Procon's assertion. UDOT did not waive its right to 
assert lack of notice by considering Procon's claim. As soon as 
the Engineer became aware of the letter, he pointed out the fact 
that he had not seen the letter and was totally unaware of the 
fact that Procon had any concern about the way in which the waste 
material was to be placed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UDOT HAS MARTIALED ALL OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE 
RECORE) WHICH RELATES TO NOTICE OF PROCON'S 
INTENT TO CLAIM ADDED PAYMENT AND IT FAILS TO 
SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDING THAT UDOT WAS ON 
NOTICE OF SUCH INTENT. 
Under Point I of its brief, Procon asserts that UDOT 
has failed to marshall the evidence which supports the findings 
2 
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I 
of the trial court. Despite the fact that Procon cites numerous 
authorities which describe what is required of UDOT and what the 
appellate court can and cannot do, they fail to cite any 
specifics to support the said allegation as to Point 1 of UDOT's 
brief. Under Point II of its brief, Procon in sub-section A 
attempts to defend the Court's finding that UDOT was notified by 
Procon that it intended to claim added compensation due to a 
change in the waste area. Their argument is essentially a 
recitation of factual events which they argue constitute a change 
in the location of the waste area and how it affects Procon. The 
Court's finding that UDOT was on "notice" is Finding of Fact 
Number 21. None of the detail which Procon has laid out in its 
brief about the change in the waste area location is set out in 
the letter of April 14, 1986 (Exhibit 18-P), which is the only 
evidence in the course of the construction which deals with 
notice. Contract provisions provide that if the contractor is 
required to do something by the Engineer which is contrary to the 
plans, and the contractor intends to seek added payment as a 
result, that the contractor must notify the owner in writing. 
(Exhibit 5P, Sec. 104.02) The notification also must show how 
the direction or change will adversely affect the contractor and 
is supposed to be served before the contractor does the work. 
This then gives the owner the opportunity to either reverse the 
direction, to negotiate with the contractor over the price of the 
change, or it gives the owner a chance to keep records of the 
3 
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effort as to time and equipment. In some cases it gives the 
owner a chance to decide to terminate the contract for the 
owner's convenience. 
UDOT does not deny that the waste material was placed 
in a location east of the exact location specified on the plans 
for the waste area itself. The plans also provide for a slope 
that is required for fills at the specified angle of two feet 
horizontal to one foot in elevation. The engineer calculated and 
caused stakes to be placed for the required slope. All of the 
waste material placed on this project is encompassed within this 
slope angle (R. 652, 653) . Apparently the design engineer forgot 
to include the area of the slope in the specified waste area 
location. Changes of this nature are a common occurence in the 
field. Most of the time such changes are ignored unless the 
contractor feels they are to his disadvantage or the engineer 
recognizes that the change will adversely affect the contractor 
in which case some agreement regarding compensation is usually 
worked out at the time. 
The plans required the roadway to be widened as it 
emerges from a cut. The contractor had to access the bottom of 
the fill by means of a roadway which he had to construct down 
slope to the east in order to construct the fill from the bottom 
up so that it could be compacted. In the judgment of the 
engineer it was just as easy to place waste material adjacent to 
the roadway fill as it was to place it in the exact location 
4 
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specified by the plans (R. 685-686). The linear distance was 
some 300 feet greater for some of the material. A slope was 
required in any event to support the material wherever it was 
located, so the location of the slope was staked to coincide with 
the widened fill (R. 652,653,658,666-671). 
The argument UDOT has made in its opening brief and 
which is reiterated here is that it was never notified during the 
performance of the work that Procon considered that it was 
adversely affected by the adjustment in the location of the waste 
material. Nothing cited in Procon's brief supports the Court's 
finding that UDOT was so notified. The letter of April 14, 1986 
(Exhibit 18-P) is the only possible evidence of notice. 
UDOT has already marshalled all the evidence that is 
before the Court that could possibly support finding of fact 
number 21. The letter would no doubt constitute notice 
sufficient to put UDOT on notice that Procon had concern about 
the change in placement of waste material if it had been received 
by UDOT. The evidence before the trial judge simply fails to 
establish that UDOT ever received notice, either in writing or 
verbally during the performance of the work (R.657-659). There 
is no evidence in the record that the Engineer reacted to the 
letter by discussing the matter of added payment with Procon, or 
that he had discussion with anyone concerning the waste area 
staking, or that he gave direction to his inspector personnel to 
keep records of Procon's effort to move waste material, or any 
5 
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f 
other indicator which would support the fact that UDOT ever in 
fact received the letter. The Engineer stated he did not see the 
letter until several years later during trial preparation and 
that he had searched the project file and did not find the letter 
therein (R.657). Procon fails to cite any conversation with UDOT 
personnel that would support a finding of notice by the Court. 
It is significant that the two people that should know about the 
events in the letter, if anyone did, both seemed to know nothing 
about the letter. The purported author, Fillmore, could not 
recall anything about it (R.136). Didericksen only knew that he 
had a copy in the file. He didn't know who prepared the letter, 
who typed it, who mailed it, or indeed, if it was in fact mailed 
(R.137). The Court may have the prerogative to admit the letter, 
as a business record in light of the ruling in State ex rel. 
Marquez, 560 P.2d 342 (Utah 1977), but to conclude that it 
establishes the fact of notice to UDOT in the face of the 
uncontroverted evidence which was before the Court that it had 
never been received by UDOT is an abuse of discretion. The 
charge that UDOT has failed to marshall the evidence to support 
the Court's finding of notice is not true. The fact of notice to 
UDOT rides or falls on the April 14, 1986 letter. There simply 
is no any other evidence to marshall concerning Finding of Fact 
Number 21. In this context UDOT submits that the admissability 
of Exhibit 18-P is questionable under the guidelines found in 
State v. Bertal, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983), particularly the 
6 
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Fourth guideline which speaks to the circumstances surrounding 
preparation of the document. In this case, the circumstances 
recounted above do not lend credence to the letter. 
Procon accuses UDOT of urging strict compliance with 
the contract requirement concerning notice of the contractor's 
intent to claim added payment. This charge is not quite correct. 
UDOT is simply urging the position that it is entitled to notice 
before it can be held accountable. The April 14, 1986 letter is 
deficient according to the contract specification as to details 
of how the change will impact the contractor. Such details can 
be overlooked, but not the fact that no notice was ever received. 
POINT II 
THE RULING OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN THE 
THORN CASE IS NOT CONTROLLING AS TO THE ISSUE 
OF NOTICE. 
Procon argues under Point II, Part B of its brief that 
this case is "strikingly similar" to the Thorn case. (Thorn 
Construction v. UDOT, 598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979)). Procon also 
asserts that UDOT "without specifically stating, requests that 
this Court reject Thorn". Procon is wrong on both counts. UDOT 
in its opening brief was careful to point out that the Thorn 
case, despite the fact that it deals with the issue of notice and 
construes the same notice provision of the contract, is not 
applicable here. In Thorn a verbal directive was issued by the 
UDOT Engineer to Thorn's superintendant. The directive required 
the widening of a roadway and clearly involved added effort not 
7 
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shown on the plans. It was correct for the Court to conclude 
that written notice was not required in that instance since the 
effort required was beyond the scope of the plans. Here the 
Engineer staked the waste area in a location that he felt was as 
easily accessable to Procon as the plan specified location 
(R.684-686). He assumed that Procon would use the haul road, 
which obviously had to be constructed to enable the roadway 
embankment to be built, to haul the waste material to be 
positioned (R. 693,694). All of this "changed location" is 
within the slope angle required by the plans in any event, and a 
slope would have been required in order to support the placement 
of material in the plan specified location, so he clearly assumed 
that it would make no difference to Procon (R.658). There was no 
verbal dialogue concerning the change as there was in Thorn. In 
this type of fact situation if the contractor has a concern he 
has a duty to so inform the Engineer in writing or forfeit any 
claim if he does not. (See Roberts v. Security Trust & Savings 
Bank, 196 Cal. 557, 238 P. 673 (1925); Bannon v. Jackson, 121 
Tenn. 381, 117 S.W. 504 (1908) and Wunderlich Contracting v. 
U.S.. 351 F2d 956, 173 Ct. CI. 180 (1965)). UDOT contends that 
Thorn is not applicable to the situation here but that State v. 
Omega Painting, 463 N.E.2d 287 (Ind. App.1984) is applicable. 
That case construes the same specification from the Indiana 
Highway specifications as the one that is applicable in this 
case. Procon attempts to distinguish Omega by arguing that there 
8 
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was no evidence to show that there was a modification of the 
contract whereas here the Court found that the waste area was 
changed. The problem is that the evidence shows that as far as 
UDOT's Engineer is concerned that he viewed the plans as 
requiring a slope which he staked and which accomodated all of 
the waste material. In his view there was no significant or 
material change. He therefore had no reason to suspect that the 
contractor viewed the "change" otherwise; hence the need for 
notice. In Thorn, the Engineer knew that the work he directed 
was an extra to the plan but no written notice was served by 
Thorn and the Court took the position that it was not required. 
In this case the Court has decided that there was a change in the 
waste area location but that does not mean that the Engineer 
recognized it as such or considered it a material or compensible 
change. It is therefore unfair to in effect judicially waive the 
notice requirement. The contract places the burden of notice on 
the contractor and the court should respect that as a valid 
contractual obligation. 
There is a real question as to whether Procon was in fact 
hurt by the so called "change" despite the finding of the Court 
that the waste area was a "significant modification of the 
plans". Procon's field people did not seem concerned since they 
noted the change in mid-March of 1986 and it was mid-April before 
the disputed letter was dated, hardly an indication that the 
contractor was put to a disadvantage. The fact that Procon 
9 
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finally got around to writing a letter almost a month late is 
evidence that they understood that they had a contractual 
obligation to notify UDOT. The problem is they had already 
performed substantial work in accordance with the so-called 
change and probably waived their right to seek relief. This is 
all the more reason that the court should have excluded the 
letter and denied their claim. The contract in fact requires 
notice "before the contractor begins work". In any event, it is 
UDOT's position that Thorn is clearly distinguishable from the 
facts of this case. 
POINT III 
UDOT WAS PREJUDICED BY LACK OF NOTICE AND DID 
NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO ASSERT SAME. 
Under Point II, part C, of its brief, Procon makes the 
incredible argument that even if there was no formal notice given 
to UDOT that the claim of Procon is not barred because UDOT is 
not prejudiced by lack of notice. They argue that since UDOT 
reviewed the claim of Procon on its merits that UDOT waived the 
right to raise the issue of lack of formal notice. UDOT denies 
that it waived its right to assert lack of notice. UDOT's 
position has been clear from the beginning. When the claim was 
first presented, UDOT denied any liability and Norman Clyde's 
testimony at trial to the effect that the only possible liability 
which UDOT would have would be based on the added haul distance 
of some of the material and would be about $3500 is the only 
10 
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concession UDOT ever made. The fact that UDOT did not receive 
Procon's letter of April 14, 1986 was not discovered until 1990 
during trial preparation. Therefore, it could not have waived 
lack of notice until its Engineer was aware of the letter. The 
letter is referred to in Procon's claim and everyone who reviewed 
the claim at UDOT headquarters apparently assumed that the letter 
had been received in due course and that lack of notice was not 
an issue. UDOT initially sought the assistance of the Rollins, 
Brown & Gunnell engineering firm to aid in evaluating Procon's 
claim before it responded to Procon. Their analysis was focused 
on the merits of the claim from an engineering and construction 
standpoint. They never discovered the lack of notice to UDOT 
during their evaluation. Lack of notice was raised at trial when 
Exhibit 18-P was proferred. By then it was recognized that the 
letter had not been received prior to the termination of the 
contract and that UDOT's Engineer was never informed that Procon 
had any concern about the placement of the waste material as it 
was staked (R.658,659). It was pointed out to the Court that 
Exhibit 18-P was not received by UDOT and objection to its 
admittance as an exhibit at trial was initially sustained due to 
lack of foundation. To allege that UDOT was not disadvantaged by 
lack of notice when Procon subsequently files a claim of over 
$2,000,000 following termination of the contract, based largely 
on the claim that Procon incurred extra costs because of an 
alleged change in the waste area, is unbelievable. 
11 
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I 
Procon's argument that UDOT's position regarding the 
location of the waste area would have been the same, with or 
without notice, is pure speculation and ignores the fact that 
there were many options that UDOT could have exercised to reduce 
or eliminate costs of the nature that Procon has alleged it 
incurred, including the right to terminate the contract. Had 
UDOT realized that Procon intended to seek such an enormous added 
payment, there is no doubt that adjustments would have been made. 
It does little good to speculate as to what would have happened; 
but the point is, UDOT was not afforded the opportunity due to 
lack of notice. Procon's assertion is based on the testimony of 
UDOT's engineer, Hugh Kirkham, that he did not agree that there 
had been a change in the waste area (R. 671, 684) . Kirkham 
explained his reasons for said assertion in further testimony at 
trial (R.685-686). All of this line of questioning is remote and 
speculative as the trial judge recognized in sustaining an 
objection to that effect during questioning by counsel for Procon 
(R. 684) . The bottom line is, so to speak, that UDOT was 
entitled to notice that Procon intended to seek more 
compensation, and the record fails to demonstrate that UDOT ever 
received notice during performance of the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision to admit Exhibit 18-P as a 
business record after testimony failed to establish an adequate 
foundation for its admittance otherwise is error in the context 
12 
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of the facts of this case. The letter was meant to convey notice 
that Procon intended to seek added payment for work which UDOT's 
Engineer considered to be encompassed within contract 
requirements and no more costly than had the contract specified 
location been used. UDOT is clearly entitled to notice under 
contract provisions and the record at trial demonstrates that 
notice was not received by UDOT nor was it waived either 
expressly or by implication. There was no verbal direction to 
Procon unlike the facts in the Thorn case, and the so called 
"change" was actually encompassed within the terms of the 
contract so the facts in the view of UDOT's Engineer did not 
excuse the written notice requirement as they did in Thorn. As 
to what might have happened had UDOT received notice is simply 
speculation; but it is safe to say that UDOT would never have 
agreed to pay anything remotely near the $507,300 which the trial 
judge awarded. Finding of Fact Number 21 to the effect that UDOT 
was on notice of Procon's intention to claim added payment for a 
change in the location of the waste area is not supported by the 
evidence. UDOT has in fact marshalled all the evidence that 
would support such a finding and it begins and ends with the 
letter of April 14, 1986 which was dated nearly thirty days late, 
deficient in all respects, not shown to have been received by 
UDOT, and which should never have been admitted into evidence. 
This Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and 
dismiss this part of Procon's claim. 
13 
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UDOT seeks relief as outlined in Section II, III, and 
IV of its original brief in addition to the relief outlined in 
Section I of its original brief as amplified in this Reply Brief, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this • p day of July, 1993 
FORD 
Assistant- Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two 
copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT on this 7th day 
of July, 1993, to the following: 
Robert F. Babcock 
WALSTAND & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^kM-.^l. 
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